something an individual, becau se it is only qua individual of a certain kind
that the individual has these properties, and not as a ‘bare’ individual:
[I]t would not make sense to assume that Caius might perhaps be brave,
learned, etc., and yet not be a man. The single human is what he is in
particular, only insofar as he is, first of all, human as such, and within the
universal; and this universal is not just something over and above the other
abstract qualities or mere determinations of reflection, but is rather what
permeates and includes within itself everything particular.
40
This then leads to the judgement a nd syllogism of necessity, where the
particular pr operties that distinguish one individual from another (e.g. this
straight line from this curved line) are seen as different manifestations of a
shared substance universal (linearity) by virtue of being different particular-
izations of the way that universals can be (lines are either stra ight or
curved). Therefore, not only do we see how universality is essential to
particularity (Caius can only be a particular individual if he is a man); we
also see how particularity is essential to universality (Caius cannot be a ‘man
in general’, but must be a determinate example of a man, whose differences
from other men nonethele ss do not prevent him exemplifying the same
universal ‘man’).
41
At this point, Hegel says, we have arrived at the
40
Ibid., translation modified:
. . . es keinen Sinn haben wu
¨
rde, anzunehmen, Gajus ko
¨
nnte etwa auch nicht Mensch,
aber doch tapfer, gelehrt usw. sein. Was der einzelne Mensch im Besonderen ist, das ist
er nur insofern, als er vor allen Dingen Mensch als solcher ist und im Allgemeinen ist,
und dies Allgemeine ist nicht nur etwas außer und neben anderen abstrakten
Qualita
¨
ten oder bloßen Reflexionsbestimmungen, sondern vielmehr das alles
Besondere Durchdringende und in sich Beschließende.
(Werke, Vol. VIII, p. 327)
Cf. Hegel, Science of Logic, pp. 36–7:
[E]ach human being though infinitely unique is so primarily because he is a man, and
each individual animal is such an individual primarily because it is an animal: if this is
true, then it would be impossible to say what such an individual could still be if its
foundation were removed, no matter how richly endowed the individual might be with
other predicates, if, that is, this foundation can equally be called a predicate like the
others.
(. . . wie jedes menschliche Individuum, [ob]zwar ein unendlich eigentu
¨
mliches, das
Prius aller seiner Eigentu
¨
mlichkeit darin, Mensch zu sein, in sich hat, wie jedes einzelne
Tier das Prius, Tier zu sein, so wa
¨
re nicht zu sagen, was, wenn diese Grundlage aus
dem mit noch so vielfachen sonstigen Pra
¨
dikaten Ausgeru
¨
steten weggenommen
wu
¨
rde, ob sie gleich wie die anderen ein Pra
¨
dikat genannt werden kann, – was so ein
Individuum noch sein sollte.)
(Werke, Vol. V, p. 26)
41
Cf. Hegel, Encyclopaedia Logic, x24 Addition, pp. 56–7:
[I]n speaking of a definite animal, we say that it is [an] ‘animal.’ ‘Animal as such’
cannot be pointed out; only a definite animal can ever be pointed at. ‘The animal’ does
not exist; on the contrary, this expression refers to the universal nature of single
animals, and each existing animal is something that is much more concretely
HEGEL AND THE CONCRETE UNIVERSAL 129
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