ABSTRACT universal User Manual download pdf (Page 23)

Hegel’s crucial discussion of the will can be found in the ‘Introduction’ to

the Philosophy of Right, xx5–7:

The will contains (a) the element of pure indeterminacy or of the ‘I’’s pure

reﬂection into itself, in which every limitation, every content . . . is dissolved.

This is the limitless inﬁnity of absolute abstraction or universality, the pure thin-

king of oneself . . . (b) In the same way, ‘I’ is the transition from undiﬀerentiated

indeterminacy to diﬀerentiation, determination,andthepositing of a determinacy

as a content and object . . . Through this positing of itself as something deter-

minate,‘I’ steps into existence [Dasein] in general – the absolute moment of

the ﬁnitude or particularization of the ‘I’. . . (g) The will is the unity of both these

moments – particularity reﬂected into itself and thereby restored to universality.

It is individuality [Einzelheit], the self-determination of the ‘I’, in that it posits itself

as the negative of itself, that is, as determinate and limited, and at the same time

remains with itself [bei sich], that is, in its identity with itself and universality; and

in this determination, it joins together with itself alone . . . This is the freedom of

the will, which constitutes the concept or substantiality of the will, its gravity, just

as gravity constitutes the substantiality of a body.

In very brief terms, I take Hegel’s idea here to be this: as a subject, I may view

myself and my will in two ways that are at ﬁrst apparently opposed to each

other: on the one hand, I can abstract from all my particular projects and

concerns, and see myself in purely universal terms, as just an ‘I’ or universal

subject, not tied to anything determinate, but able to view things from an

utterly universal point of view; but if I do so, I will lose my will, for to act is

always to act in some particular way or other, which thus can never feel like a

proper expression of my universality, so that if I do act, I must always destroy

the product of my action in a cycle of negation – or at least feel that that

they give to the will in underpinning their holism, in a way that I will now ascribe to Hegel: see,

for example, Bosanquet’s discussion of the will in Chap IX of The Philosophical Theory of the

State.

Hegel, Philosophy of Right, xx5–7, pp. 37–41

Der Wille entha

lt a) das Element der reinen Unbestimmtheit oder der reinen Reﬂexion

des Ich in sich, in welcher jede Beschra

nkung, jeder...Inhalt aufgelo

st ist; die

schrankenlose Unendlichkeit der absoluten Abstraktion oder Allgemeinheit,dasreine

Denken seiner selbst...b)EbensoistIch das U

bergehen aus underschiedsloser

Unbestimmtheit zur Unterscheidung, Bestimmen und Setzen einer Bestimmtheit als

eines Inhalts und Gegenstands . . . Durch dies Setzen seiner selbst als eines bestimmten

tritt Ich in das Dasein u

berhaupt; – das absolute Moment der Endlichkeit oder

Besonderung des Ich . . . g) Der Wille ist die Einheit dieser beiden Momente; die in sich

reﬂektierte und dadurch zur Allgemeinheit zuru

ckgefu

hrte Besonderheit;–Einzelheit;die

Selbstbestimmung des Ich, in einem sich als das Negative seiner selbst, na

mlich als

bestimmt, beschra

nkt zu setzen und bei sich, d. i. in seiner Identita

t mit sich und

Allgemeinheit zu bleiben, und in der Bestimmung, sich nur mit sich selbst

zusammenzuschließen...Dies ist die Freiheit des Willens, welche seine Begriﬀ oder

Substantialita

t, seine Schwere so ausmacht wie die Schwere die Sustantialita

tdes

rpers.

(Werke, Vol. VII, pp. 49–55)

HEGEL AND THE CONCRETE UNIVERSAL 137

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